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MANNE, MERGERS, AND THE
MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
Fred S. McChesneyt
I went down to the sacred store
Where I'd heard the music years before.'
INTRODUCTION
Although increasing longevity may well bankrupt the Social Se-
curity fund before my contemporaries and I get there, one of longev-
ity's admitted benefits is the increased ability of the truly wise, truly
seminal thinkers in intellectual society to see the fruits of their labors,
even to add to our understanding of them. And so, as he moves past
his seventieth year, Henry Manne is not only able to participate in the
celebration of his contributions, but to add his latter-day reflections
on them. It goes without saying that the words "wise" and "seminal"
accurately describe Henry's contributions, along many margins.
Those several margins are discussed in detail throughout this Sympo-
sium.
At the outset, we are considering in particular the Manneian no-
tion-indeed, his very creation of the concept-of the "market for
corporate control."2 In anticipation of receiving Professor Carney's
lead article, I went back and read Manne's Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control3 I first read the article as a graduate student in
economics in the mid-1970s, when it was already some ten years old.
To students slavishly devoted to the scientific method-in hopeful
anticipation of defending a dissertation some day-it was a decep-
tively easy piece to read. Indeed, it was practically devoid of ortho-
dox economic methodology. Unlike everything else we were study-
ing, the article had no math, no hypotheses, no tests, and no R-
squareds.
t Class of 1967/James B. Haddad Professor, Law School; and Professor, Department of
Management and Strategy, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern Uni-
versity.
I DON McLEAN, American Pie, on AMERICAN PIE (Capitol Records 1980).
2 In conversations with me, Henry himself credits Armen Alchian for helping him think
generally in terms of "the market for this," or "the market for that."
-1 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965).
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So this assignment promised a light night, only eleven pages,
easily read within an hour, even less. I think a common reaction
among most of us graduate students was: What's the big deal? And
what is this article doing in, of all places, the very prestigious Journal
of Political Economy?
History has proven what a revolutionary paper -Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control really was, as Professor Carney's ex-
cellent paper illustrates.4  In demonstrating generally how path-
breaking Henry Manne's work was, the Carney paper accomplishes
several objectives. Not the least of them is simply the reminder that it
was Henry Manne who first realized the importance of this thing
called the "market for corporate control."5 It is curious how often
today the genesis of the idea is forgotten. A recent encyclopedia of
law and economics included an entry for "market for corporate con-
trol," which covered four almost coffee-table sized pages, with double
columns and small print, and appended a bibliography of over thirty
entries.6 The bibliography did not include the seminal Manne article,
nor was the founder's contribution mentioned in the text.
That's the bad news. But the good news is that the notion of a
market for corporate control is now so well established that its origins
no longer need citation. Henry's contribution is thus like Alfred Mar-
shall's graphical introduction of the downward-sloping demand
curve, a price-theory concept now so fundamental and well accepted
that no one cites Marshall for its derivation.7 Professor Carney's
4 See William J. Carney, The Legacy of "The Market for Corporate Control" and the
Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1999) [hereinafter Manne
Legacy]. I second Bill Carney's opening personal remarks in his article. As Henry Manne did
for Bill, so did Henry alter my life. Having left Columbia Law School after just two months,
discouraged by a lack of theoretical and empirical rigor in statements being propounded as
truths, I switched to studying economics at the University of Virginia. It was only through the
different prism on law offered by Henry Manne's Law and Economics Center that, on returning
to Law School at the University of Miami, I discovered what was truly interesting and impor-
tant, to me at least, in legal study and scholarship.
5 The Carney paper usefully recalls that Henry Manne initiated the phrase "the market for
corporate control" a year before publication of'"Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control."
See id. at 234; Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor
ofAdolfA. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1427, 1444 (1964). For economists, this publication
would have been much less accessible than Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control.
6 See R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, Market for Corporate Control, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, 611-15 (PETER NEWMAN ED., 1998).
But see Henry N. Butler, Board of Directors, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 165 (PETER NEWMAN ED., 1998) ('Economists interested in the
relation between shareholders and the senior management of large corporations have identified
numerous market forces, including the market for corporate control (Manne 1965), that give
managers the incentives to control agency costs.").
7 For the record, the citation is ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: AN
INTRODUCTORY VOLUME 81 n.2 (8th ed. 1952). In fact, although the diagrammatic downward-
sloping demand curve is typically attributed to Marshall, several other economists had presented
equivalent diagrams generations before Marshall. See Thomas M Humphrey, Precursors of the
[Vol. 50:245
1999] MERGERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 247
points here are very well taken. Even measured just by a citation
count, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control is in the all-
time top-twenty for law review citations, a feat Carney rightfully
celebrates all the more, given that the article was not published in a
law review or even an interdisciplinary law and economics journal.
The concept and the phrase, "the market for corporate control," have
passed into common parlance, as evidenced by the fact that the phrase
is used almost four times for every time it is actually cited to Henry
Manne. Thus Henry Manne has become the latest winner of the "Al-
fred Marshall Prize" for uncited, unattributed ideas.
Overall, Professor Carney's paper is a wonderful summary of all
the concepts, accepted without second thought today, that were un-
known or only dimly perceived before Henry Manne began writing in
the early 1960s. Take, for example, the idea that market-based eco-
nomic theory held the key for understanding corporate firms, or divi-
sion of labor and free-rider problems that define shareholder roles in
large corporations. These and other ideas are central to legal and
economic thinking about the corporation today, and as Professor Car-
ney indicates, all are parts of the integrated Manne oeuvre on how to
think about the corporation. Central to the Manne legacy, though,
was his identification of the "market for corporate control."
The Carney paper does an excellent job spelling out what made
recognition of the market for corporate control so important, and in-
deed, how that recognition revolutionized all of economic and legal
thinking about corporate firms. Others writing on this subject also
will have more to say about this notion of the "market for corporate
control." In atonement for my blinkered vision as a graduate student,
I would like to highlight three particular aspects of the article that I
think are important, and, as one too callow at the time to appreciate
how revolutionary Manne's work was, help to put into context what a
really seminal piece this was.
I. THREE CONTRIBUTIONS
A. The Reasons for Corporate Mergers
First, as Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control makes
clear in its first 3 pages (i.e., almost 30 percent of the article), mergers
in 1965 were viewed as phenomena of interest strictly in terms of in-
dustrial organization (for economists) and antitrust law (for lawyers).
Marshallian Cross, TH MARGIN, Spring 1993, at 31. No one, however, claims to antedate
Henry Manne in propounding the phrase and the concept of the "market for corporate control."
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'Further, mergers in the 1960s were coming to be treated as virtually
per se illegal, at least when challenged by the government.8 But
Manne explained why both economics and law were missing the
larger picture. First, he said, mergers should not be analyzed within
the framework of the economics and law of competition, or at least
not most of the time. Rather, mergers are to be understood within the
framework of the emerging fields of financial economics and law.
9
In approaching mergers within a finance framework, Henry
Manne illustrated what lawyers so often bring to the table in the aca-
demic world of law and economics, something that economists typi-
cally are unable to provide. In 1965, economists were concerned
about mergers within a competition framework because that was how
economists had always treated mergers. They were to be viewed in a
cost-benefit sense, with the costs in particular being registered in
terms of diminished competition. So were they treated at the Univer-
sity of Chicago at the time Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control was written, with George Stigler particularly noteworthy for
his skepticism as to the competitive benefits of mergers. 10
As a lawyer, however, Manne was familiar with legal cases in-
volving sales of controlling blocks of shares in contexts having noth-
ing to do with putative problems of competition." In the paper's first
important contribution, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Con-
trol noted that, in effect, there were two ways that a merger might
increase the wealth of the merging parties. True, if competition were
diminished by a merger's creating market power, that might motivate
the merger, while, of course, decreasing social wealth by raising
prices. Manne noted, however, that there was another way that
merger might increase merging parties' wealth, in a way that actually
increased societal wealth as well. Manne writes:
8 The Celler-Kefauver Amendments to § 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950 had greatly tipped
the scales in favor of the government in merger challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (enjoining merger resulting in a 7 percent share of relevant
market); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (finding prima facie
illegal a merger of two banks resulting in a 30 percent share of the market) ; Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (holding that merger of two firms with a resulting market
share of 5 percent was illegal). In Von's Grocery, the virtual per se illegality of mergers chal-
lenged by the government sparked Justice Stewart's famous remark, "The sole consistency [in
merger cases] that I can find is that in litigation under § 7, the Government always wins." Von's
Grocery, 384 U.S. at 301.
9 As explained further below, there really was no such field as "financial economics" at
the time Manne wrote, at least not in the domains that Marine discussed.
10 The Manne article noted this Chicago approach to mergers. See Marine, supra note 3,
at 111 n.6 (citing George J. Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Anti-Trust Policy, 54 U. PA. L.
REv. 176, 181 (1955) (claiming it to be "most uncommon" that a merger would increase com-
petition).
1 See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), discussed in Manne,
supra note 3, at 116 n.21.
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The basic proposition advanced in this paper is that the con-
trol of corporations may constitute a valuable asset; that this
asset exists independent of any interest in either economies of
scale or monopoly profits; that an active market for corporate
control exists; and that a great many mergers are probably the
result of the successful workings of this special market.12
It was not increases in market power nor decreases in production
costs, economists' favorite explanations for merger gains, that neces-
sarily explained mergers. At least equally possible as the rationale for
mergers were improvements in management, made possible by trans-
actions in corporate control.1
3
B. Corporate Control Transactions as Shareholder Protection
Devices
From this initial-and revolutionary-perspective flows the arti-
cle's second contribution, and Professor Carney's paper rightly gives
this second insight central importance in the paradigm shift about
corporate control changes that followed publication of the Manne ar-
ticle. The market for corporate control is really to be understood in
consumer-protection terms, with "consumers" in that market being
shareholders. In the pre-Manne era, the prevailing academic para-
digm treated shareholders-that is, consumer-purchasers of corporate
shares-as chumps. They were routinely, and so predictably, bam-
boozled by managers supposedly advancing shareholder welfare but
really maximizing their own welfare.14 Management operated seem-
ingly without constraints in bilking shareholders.
But, Manne noted, the corporate control needed to undertake
such machinations is subject to market forces. And if markets ordi-
narily operate reasonably competitively, would not shareholder sov-
ereignty emerge in this market, just as consumer sovereignty emerges
in competitive markets generally? So, Manne wrote, mergers "are of
12 Manne, supra note 3, at 112.
13 It is interesting that Manne never specifies any particular way in which a change in
corporate control, resulting in new management, will increase the value of the firm. He refers
only generally to management being "more efficient," or of its "revitalization of a poorly run
company." UL at 113. In that sense, Manne's view of efficient management parallels Austrian
economists' views of entrepreneurship. See, e.g., ISRAEL M. KuzNER, DISCOVERY AND THE
CAPrmtTsT PROCESS 7 (1985) (stating that an entrepreneurial activity "reflects the decision
maker's belief that he has discovered possibilities that both he and his actual or potential com-
petitors had hitherto not seen. Such discoveries may reflect alertness to changed conditions or
to overlooked possibilities.... The crucial element in behavior expressing entrepreneurial alert-
ness is that it expresses the decision maker's ability spontaneously to transcend an existing
framework of perceived opportunities").
14 See Manne Legacy, supra note 4, at 220-25 (providing an excellent distillation of this
view).
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considerable importance for the protection of individual non-
controlling shareholders .... ,,15 Thus, as the Carney paper elucidates
meticulously, for the first time the famous Berle-Means concern
about the separation of ownership and control was seen for what it
truly is: an undeniable fact but one that invites, and has elicited, a
market solution because it offers manager-entrepreneurs individual
gains while protecting other shareholders as well.16 This was Henry
Manne's central point. He writes:
Basically this paper will constitute an introduction to a study
of the market for corporation control .... Perhaps the most
important implications are those for the alleged separation of
ownership and control in large corporations. So long as we
are unable to discern any control relationship between small
shareholders and corporate management, the thrust of Berle
and Means's famous phrase remains strong. But . . . the
market for corporate control gives to these shareholders both
power and protection commensurate with their interest in
corporate affairs.
In redefining mergers and the market for corporate control in
consumer (shareholder) protection terms, the Manne approach antici-
pated future developments in parallel areas. When "Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control" appeared, things like advertising and
product differentiation were-like mergers-typically analyzed ac-
cording to their supposed impacts on competition. And viewed that
way, they were-like mergers-typically treated with suspicion.
18
Advertising, for example, was viewed as a source of market power
that would enable antitrust authorities to defeat an acquisition when
the acquiring firm was a heavy advertiser.1 9 That perception of ad-
vertising was just beginning to change in 1965, with the realization
15 Manne, supra note 3, at 119.
16 See id. at 113. Manne wrote:
The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient
management, the more attractive the take-over becomes to those who
believe that they can manage the company more efficiently .... But the
greatest benefits of the take-over scheme probably inure to those least
conscious of it .... Only the take-over scheme provides some assurance
of competitive efficiency among corporate managers and thereby affords
strong protection to the interests of vast numbers of small, non-
controlling shareholders. lId
17 IL at 112.
18 See, e.g., WILLIAM S. COMANOR & THOMAS A. WILSON, ADVERTISING AND MARKET
POWER (1974) (arguing that the advertising market favors big advertisers).
19 See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967)
(holding that § 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the acquisition of a smaller, but dominant, firm by
a powerful firm that advertised heavily because such a merger would substantially reduce the
competitive structure of the industry).
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that advertising should really be viewed as a way of enhancing con-
sumer sovereignty by increasing consumer information.20  The con-
gruence with the paradigm shift urged by Manne concerning merg-
ers-away from a focus on competitive problems and towards the
benefits in protecting shareholder-consumers-is striking.
C. Managerial Efficiency and Share Prices
From the perspective of economists, this shift in thinking about
mergers and the role of the market control in protecting consumers
was not just a challenge to traditional economic theorizing. It was
also a challenge to economists' practical quantitative skills. Measur-
ing changes in market power or in production costs were empirical
exercises that economists performed routinely in analyzing mergers.
It would seemingly be more difficult to undertake the quantitative
measurement that Manne was suggesting, increased efficiency in
management.21
But here, Manne made a third important contribution. Having
shifted the thinking about mergers from external market competition
to internal firm management, he pointed out how gains from in-
creased managerial efficiency should be measured: by changes in
share prices. Manne stated that "[a] fundamental premise underlying
the market for corporate control is the existence of a high positive
correlation between corporate managerial efficiency and the market
price of shares of that company." 22 Here, clearly, Manne was adum-
brating what is now called the "efficient market hypothesis," gener-
ally acknowledged as one of the most important ideas in modem fi-
nance.23 Today, analysts ordinarily accept (at the level of both theory
and empirics) at least the semi-strong form of the efficient market
hypothesis as applicable in most situations.24
20 Perhaps the most important catalyst that ultimately changed the thinking about adver-
tising was Lester G. Telser, Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POE. ECON. 537 (1964). For a
good summary of the debate and the changing perceptions, see Yale Brozen, Advertising as an
Impediment to Competition, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (Harvey J.
Goldschmid, et al. eds., 1974).
21 Measurement of increased efficiency would seem all the more difficult, given that
Manne did not specify in exactly what way (planning? production? marketing?) efficiency
would increase.
22 Manne, supra note 3, at 112.
23 See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 989-90 (5th ed. 1996).
24 See generally kL at 323-36 (explaining the weak, semi-strong, and strong forms of the
efficient market hypothesis); Steven L Jones & Jeffry M. Netter, Efficient Capital Markets, in
The Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics 569-73 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993) (providing a
general discussion of the fundamental concept of the efficient market theory).
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To modem readers, then, Manne's statement about managerial
efficiency and share prices seems self-evident. But in 1965, no such
efficient-market hypothesis was generally accepted or had even been
widely propounded.25 The full theoretical development of the effi-
cient market hypothesis was still some years away.26  Empirically,
likewise, the now mundane stock-market event study had yet to ap-
pear.27 Thus, Manne's insistence that the stock market was the ap-
propriate barometer of the gains from managerial efficiency was a
clairvoyant, even bold, aspect of his model.28
I would not overstress this last point. A great deal of theoretical
and empirical work remained to be done in 1965 on the strengths and
weaknesses of the efficient-capital-market hypothesis. But Henry
Manne, the economist, understood that if the market for corporate
control worked to protect consumers as he claimed, the effect of
greater managerial efficiency must be registered in market prices.
That in turn took him to the edge of one of the most important devel-
opments in modem finance, the ability of stock markets to accurately
price information about, inter alia, managerial performance. Subse-
quent developments have largely validated what Manne instinctively
knew must be true.
II. CONCLUSION
Of course, the contributions of Henry Manne are much more
extensive than just his most cited article. The remaining papers in
this Symposium cover his other contributions, both as scholar and
educator. But one can only be impressed by how much erudition
Henry Manne packed into the relatively few pages of Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control. While many (including myself) could
not see as far into the future as Manne could, subsequent develop-
ments in economics and law have amply demonstrated how accurate
and penetrating his vision was.
25 This is clear from Manne's footnote justification for the statement quoted supra, text
accompanying note 22. He notes that the link between information and market pricing is in one
sense an empirical proposition, but that no empirical information exists. He then explains why,
theoretically, information and stock prices would be related, but is unable to cite anyone for the
various propositions he discusses. See Manne, supra note 3, at 112 n.10.
26 BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 23, at 329 (citing theoretical developments from the
late 1960s and early 1970s); Jones & Netter, supra note 24, at 571 (dating the theoretical devel-
opment of efficient capital markets as beginning in 1970).
27 The first important empirical event study was Eugene Fama et al., The Adjustment of
Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT. ECON. REv. 1 (1969).
2 Manne boldly stated: "Apart from the stock market, we have no objective standard of
managerial efficiency." Manne, supra note 3, at 113.
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